Applied platform economics
In a two-sided market, two groups interact through an intermediary, or platform, that accounts for the externalities between the groups. Two-sided networks can be found in many industries, including search engines or communication networks such as the media and the internet. This program will focus on these industries, and propose a discussion on two important issues that are currently discussed in the economic literature: Media platforms and advertising & Search: Platform design.
The program aims at discussing the main theoretical insights suggested by the economic literature and proposing several empirical tests using real case examples that involve important actors such as radio and television broadcasters, eBay, Google, or Real estate platforms.
Students are assumed to have good knowledge of Game Theory, Microeconomics and Econometrics (Master level or very good undergraduate level).
Early bird enrollment by March 10, 2019. Applications on a rolling basis by May 31, 2019.
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The program will be organized around empirical and more theoretical discussions of several research papers. While Bernard Caillaud will focus on the theoretical aspects of each model, Philippe Gagnepain and Angelo Secchi will discuss the empirical ingredients and will present econometric exercises that exploit the real data used by the authors in each paper. The program is organized as follows:
Media platforms and advertising
In the media context, the platform is the broadcast company and the two interacting groups are advertisers and viewers. Advertisers like more viewers to receive their messages. Viewers though find advertising a nuisance insofar as it detracts from time available to watch a program. A central question in the ongoing debate about the changing media landscape is how competitive forces shape advertising levels and revenues and, hence, assist in achieving a number of important public interest goals, such as enhancing entry and diversity of content.
Search: Platform design
Search frictions play an important role in retail markets and help explain how retailers manage to maintain positive markups even when they compete to sell almost identical goods. In online commerce, the physical costs of search are much lower than in traditional offline settings: Consumers shopping online can use either price search engines or compare prices at e-commerce marketplaces, or internet platforms. On the one hand, these platforms attempt to limit search frictions and provide consumers with transparent and low prices. On the other hand, many retailers would like to differentiate their products to limit price competition. These often conflicting incentives highlight the important role of the platform design, which structures online search in a way that affects consumer search and seller incentives at the same time.
About this institute
The Paris School of Economics develops economics research of the highest international standard and disseminates the results. It brings together a community of 140 researchers and around 200 PhD students, and offers teaching in Masters, Summer School and Executive Education programs...
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